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L GGERHEAD TURTLE V. CouYCouNCL: THE FUTURE
OF FEE SHIFTING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION?
E. CARTER CHANDLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress and the Supreme Court have clearly stated that they hold the
preservation of endangered species to be of paramount importance, attemp-
ting under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") to "halt and reverse the trend
toward species extinction, whatever the cost."' For the past several decades,
citizen suits under ESA have played a central role in the realization of this
goal. Congress has viewed the filing of legitimate citizen suits as a public
service and has attempted to encourage citizens to perform this service
through passing statutes that allow fee shifting for successful plaintiffs.2 In
the 2001 case, Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia Depart-
ment of Health & Human Resources, the Supreme Court limited fee shifting
in citizen suits by holding that, at least under the Fair Housing Amendments
Act ("FHAA") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the
catalyst theory3 cannot be used for attorneys' fees recovery and that courts
can only grant attorneys' fees to plaintiffs who prevail on the substantive
merits of their cases and have been awarded some relief by a court.4 Since the
"E. Carter Chandler is a J.D. candidate attending the College of William & Mary School of
Law. She has her B. A. in French and Psychology from the University of Virginia. She
would like to express her appreciation to Steven A.G. Davison, Professor of Law at
University of Baltimore School of Law, for his inspiration and guidance during her Note
writing process.
'Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
2H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 337 (1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1416 (regarding the
reasons for enacting the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act ("CAA")); S. REP. No.
91-1196, at 38 (1970) (discussing the social value of citizen suit provisions).
3 The Supreme Court, in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.,
484 U.S. 49, 67 n.6 (1987), defined the catalyst test by stating "if as a result of a citizen
proceeding and before a verdict is issued, a defendant abated a violation, the court may
award litigation expenses borne by the plaintiffs in prosecuting such actions," (quoting S.
REP. No. 92-414, at 81 (1971); see also Wanda A. Dotson, Mootness and Attorney's Fees
Under the Clean Water Act in the Old Timer, Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation
District, 15 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 327, 325 (2000-2001).
' Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598
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Buckhannon decision, the lower courts have interpreted this limitation in
various ways. Some lower courts have interpreted Buckhannon as prohibiting
the use of the catalyst theory to award attorneys' fees under any federal
citizen suit statute,5 while other courts have held that Buckhannon does not
prohibit use of the catalyst theory to award attorneys' fees under federal
statutes where there is clear congressional intent to permit use of the catalyst
theory.6
A recent decision in the Eleventh Circuit interpreted Buckhannon as
inapplicable to citizen suits brought under the ESA, and held that attorneys'
fees can be awarded in an ESA citizen suit under the catalyst theory.7 There
are sound policy reasons for allowing the continued use of the catalyst theory
in citizen suits brought under federal environmental statutes, but some may
consider the Eleventh Circuit's decision to be contrary to the thrust of the
Supreme Court's decisions in this area. The debate is far from settled.
This Note examines the continuing evolution of the rules on fee shifting
in environmental citizen suits, centering on the Eleventh Circuit's 2002
decision in Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council. To this end, it first exam-
ines the history and policy behind statutory allowances for fee shifting and
the impact that citizen suits have on environmental law and the protection of
the environment. Second, it analyzes key Supreme Court cases, particularly
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of
Health & Human Resources9 and Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,'0 as well as
lower court decisions which have interpreted those cases, including South-
west Center for Biological Diversity, California Native Plant Society v.
(2001).
5 Johnson v. ITT Indus., Inc., 272 F.3d498, 500 (7th Cir. 2001); Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc., 261
F.3d 1026, 1029 (10th Cir. 2001); Reimer v. Champion Health Care Corp., 258 F.3d 720,
727 (8th Cir. 2001); Nat'l Coalition for Students with Disabilities v. Bush, 173 F. Supp. 2d
1272, 1277 (N.D. Fla. 2001). All cases are cited in Kyle A. Loring, The Catalyst Theory
Meets the Supreme Court-Common Sense Takes a Vacation, 43 B.C. L. REv. 973, 993
n.198 (2002).
6 Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 262 F.3d 1077, 1080 n.2 (10th Cir.
2001); Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 738,745 (2001); Southwest
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Carroll, 182 F. Supp. 2d 944, 947 (C.D. Cal. 2001);
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 307 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter
Loggerhead Turtle III].
'Loggerhead Turtle III, 307 F.3d at 1318.
8Id.
9 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
'0 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
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Carroll" and Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton.12 This Note also
considers reasons for conflict and uncertainty in this area of the law and
concludes that while the Supreme Court's opinion in Buckhannon forbids use
of the "catalyst theory" in connection with citizen suit provisions that author-
ize federal courts to award attorneys' fees to "prevailing parties," it does not
prohibit use of the catalyst test in citizen suits brought under statutory
provisions stating that courts may award attorneys' fees "whenever...
appropriate."
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Catalyst Theory Defined
The firstjudicial articulation of the catalyst theory, or catalyst test, came
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Parham v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 3 Parham is an equal opportunity case, but
the fee shifting method used in the case applies to environmental litigation.
An examination of Parham will illustrate the nature of the catalyst theory.
Arthur Ray Parham was an eighteen-year-old black man who applied for
a job as stockman at Southwestern Bell ("the Company") and was rejected
for employment.'4 The Company said that it decided not to hire him because
its background check showed that Parham had been fired from a previous job
for frequent unexplained absences from work and for being "insubordinate
[and] neglectful of duty," and because he had graduated from high school in
the bottom fifth of his class. 5 Parham filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in April 1967, accusing
the Company of racial discrimination.16 The Company later offered him ajob
as a lineman, but Parham declined. 7 Instead, Parham filed a complaint
against the Company pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964' 8 in federal
" 182 F. Supp. 2d 944 (2001).
12 262 F.3d 1077 (2001).
"3 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), noted in Loring, supra note 5, at 978.
'4 Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1970).
15 Id.
16 Id.
171d.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000). The Act prohibits employers subject to Title VII from
discriminating against employees or applicants on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000), quoted in Parham, 433 F.2d at 424.
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district court in April 1968. " Evidence at trial showed that the Company had
a history of employing many more whites than blacks, with less than two
percent of their work force being black, and that almost all of their black
employees worked in "house service," asjanitors or laborers.20 The Company
offered rebuttal evidence showing that it had adopted an affirmative action
program in late 1968 and since then, it had hired black employees at more
than twice the previous rate, and that it had increased its number of black
employees in skilled employee categories, such as telephone operators, clerks
and skilled craftsmen.2'
The trial court denied Parham relief, finding that the Company discrim-
inated in their hiring practices prior to 1968, but that implementation of the
affirmative action program had ameliorated the situation.22 The court found
that there was no evidence of employment discrimination against blacks as
a class or Parham as an individual at the time of the suit.2
Parham appealed the decision and the appellate court found that the
evidence clearly showed employment discrimination at the time of the ap-
pellant's rejection for employment and his complaint to EEOC. The court
held that while subsequent employment practices are relevant in determining
an appropriate remedy, the employment practices at the time complained of,
not those at the time of trial, should be considered for determination of
whether the employer engaged in employment discrimination.24 The appel-
late court ruled that while there was evidence of employment discrimination
against blacks as a class at the time of Parham's rejection for employment
and his complaint to EEOC, there was no conclusive evidence that the
Company denied Parham employment based on racial considerations. 2,
Therefore, the appellate court denied his claim for an injunction and dam-
ages.26
The court noted, however, that the Company implemented its affir-
mative action program and that the resulting increase in the hiring of black
employees occurred subsequent to Parham's complaint to EEOC and the ini-
9 Parham, 433 F.2d at 423.
20 d. at 424.
21 Id. at 424-25.
22 Id. at 425.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 425-26.
215 Parham, 433 F.2d at 428.
26 Id.
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tiation of his lawsuit." Based on these facts, the court found that "Parham's
lawsuit acted as a catalyst which prompted the appellee to take action
implementing its own fair employment policies and seeking compliance with
the requirements of Title VII."2 They noted further that
[i]n this sense, Parham performed a valuable public service in
bringing this action. Having prevailed in his contentions of
racial discrimination against blacks generally prior to
February, 1967, Parham is entitled to reasonable attorney's
fees, including services for this appeal, to be allowed by the
district court as authorized by 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k).29
B. Looking Backward: A History of Fee Shifting in the United States
Early in this nation's judicial history, the "American rule" against
attorneys' fee shifting emerged. The Supreme Court first articulated the rule
in 1796 in Arcambel v. Wiseman,30 when it overturned the inclusion of at-
torneys' fees as damages, stating "[t]he general practice of the United States
is in oposition [sic] to it; and even if that practice were not strictly correct in
principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or
modified, by statute."' The Supreme Court adhered closely to this rule over
the course of American history and reaffirmed it in 1975 in Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society." While there may be some statutory
exceptions to the rule, those exceptions must be explicitly stated to overcome
the American rule.33 Citizen suits became such an exception.
In classic American tradition, Congress established citizen suits in an
effort to afford citizens a check on their government.34 This practice evolved
27 Id. at 429.
28 Id. at 429-30 (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 430. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that "[i]n any action or proceeding under
this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee... ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(2000).
3' 3 U.S. 306 (3 Cranch 1796).
3 d. at 306, quotedin Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,249-50
(1975).
32 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
3 Id.; see Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 (1994).
34 Adam Babich, Citizen Suits: The Teeth in Public Participation, [1995) 25 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,141, 10,141 (Mar. 1995).
2004]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
from the common law private attorney general doctrine, by which courts
awarded attorneys' fees to plaintiffs who not only vindicated their own
interests, but also benefitted all similarly situated plaintiffs.35 Congress did
not trust administrative agencies to enforce environmental laws consistently
and therefore wanted to encourage legitimate citizen suits to act as both a
check on agency power and as a deterrent to keep agencies from shirking
their duties to uphold protection of environmental interests.36
Citizen involvement is imperative both in making sure that appropriate
laws exist for environmental protection and in implementing those laws to
help protect the environment.37 Many environmental problems manifest
themselves in specific localities, and the people who live in the affected areas
have a greater interest in protecting those areas than anyone else. Giving
them the power to help protect their environment through citizen suits is the
most efficient way to ensure protection of the environment. Judicial decisions
seeking environmental protection are also much easier to implement with the
cooperation of people living in the affected community.39 In Sierra Club v.
Costle, the D.C. Circuit ruled that "[u]nder our system of government, the
very legitimacy of general policymaking performed by unelected admin-
istrators depends in no small part upon the openness, accessibility, and
amenability of these officials to the needs and ideas of the public .... "0
Public participation ensures both that the agencies charged with environ-
3 Loring, supra note 5, at 975.
36 Babich, supra note 34, at 10,141-42.
3 It is interesting to note the likely difference in popularity between environmental statutes
that protect the beauty and cleanliness of the environment enjoyed by community residents
(such as the Clean Air Act) and those that protect endangered species living in the area (such
as the Endangered Species Act). In cases such as Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 148
F.3d 1231 (1998) (discussed infra), where citizens may see environmental protection as a
hindrance to their enjoyment of property, environmental protection legislation is likely to
find opposition in the affected community. In Loggerhead Turtle, environmentalists
requested an injunction to keep community residents and others from driving on the beaches
and using artificial light sources to illuminate the beaches during sea turtle nesting season.
Id. at 1231. Residents in the community were likely to see this as having a negative impact
on their enjoyment of property-the average citizen may value the ability to engage in the
activities that the suit sought to ban more than he does the presence of sea turtles in the area.
" Babich, supra note 34, at 10,142-43.
39 Id.
40 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citation omitted), cited in Babich, supra note 34, at
10,142.
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mental protection will seek to fulfill their duty and that they will be
successful.
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., the Supreme Court rejected the private
attorney general doctrine, ruling that the courts were authorized to engage in
fee shifting only in response to explicit legislation.41 Congress responded the
next year by passing the Fees Act of 1976, codifying the private attorney
general doctrine for prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights litigation. 2 In doing
so, Congress explicitly stated their intention to allow fee shifting for pre-
vailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases brought pursuant to statutes lacking fee
shifting provisions.43
III. KEY CASES
A. Buckhannon: Death of the Catalyst Theory?
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of
Health & Human Resources" arose under the Fair Housing Amendments
Act 45 and the Americans with Disabilities Act,46 which provide that "the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable
attorney's fee. .. ." The controversy began as a result of a West Virginia
"self-preservation" statute which prohibited residential care homes and
nursing homes from housing individuals who were unable to independently
exit the building in the event of a fire.4' The plaintiffs in the case were
nursing facility residents of who were unable to reach a fire exit without
4' Loring, supra note 5, at 976.
42 Id. at 977.
41 Id. The House report stated that "after a complaint is filed, a defendant might voluntarily
cease the unlawful practice. A court should still award fees even though it might conclude,
as a matter of equity, that no formal relief, such as an injunction, is needed." H.R. REP. No.
94-1558, at 7 (1976), quoted in Loring, supra note 5, at 979. The Senate report stated that
"parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights... without formally
obtaining relief." S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 4 (1976), quoted in Loring, supra note 5, at 979.
44 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
45 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000).
46 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
47 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2). The ADA uses almost identical language: "In any action or
administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs... ." 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000).
4' Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 623. As of 1998, the statute is no longer in effect.
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assistance, led by 102 year old Dorsey Pierce, the Buckhannon home, and an
organization of residential homes.49 When the state learned of the plaintiffs'
limitations, it ordered that the facility close its doors and relocate its
population within thirty days.5"
The plaintiffs commenced litigation to overturn both the cease-and-
desist order imposed on the facility and the self preservation statute on which
it was based.5 They alleged that the statute discriminated against persons
with disabilities, violating FHAA and ADA. 2 They requested an immediate
order stopping defendants from closing the facility, an injunction barring
enforcement of the self-preservation statute, damages, and attorney's fees.53
The plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal of their demands for damages, in re-
sponse to the state's sovereign immunity pleas.5 4 Less than a month after the
District Court ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to a trial, the state
legislature repealed the self-preservation rule and moved to dismiss the case
as moot.55 The plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees, claiming to be "prevailing
parties" under both FHAA and ADA.56
The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to an
award of attorneys' fees although they achieved the result that they sought,
holding that an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to the catalyst theory was
not permitted under FHAA and ADA. 7
As illustrated by Parham, the catalyst theory is a method of determining
whether fees should be shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant based upon
the outcome of their interaction as a whole. It does not necessarily require a
judicial decision and court remedy in favor of the plaintiff, but that the
plaintiff obtain his desired result as a product of the litigation.' In cases for
injunctive relief, defendants sometimes accede voluntarily to a plaintiffs
demands before the court makes its ultimate decision in order to avoid having
49 Id.
so Id.
51 id.
52 Id. at 623-24.
" Id. at 624.
54 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 624.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 600.
8 Definition of "catalyst theory" can be found in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 67 n.6 (1987), cited in Dotson, supra note 3, at 335. See also
the application of the catalyst theory in Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433
F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970).
484 [Vol. 28:477
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to pay the defendant's legal fees as well as being held subject to an injunc-
tion." When this happens, the litigation serves as the catalyst for the defen-
dant's change in conduct, but not the direct cause of that changed conduct,
thus the title catalyst theory.'
The Supreme Court held in Buckhannon that only a party who obtains
ajudgment on the merits maybe considered a "prevailing party" for purposes
of an attorneys' fee award, explaining that a prevailing party must secure
either ajudgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree in order to
qualify for an attorneys' fees award.6' The Court explained that the problem
with the catalyst theory is that it "allows an award where there is no judicial-
ly sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties. 62 This choice
of language indicates that the Court requires a court-ordered change in the
legal relationship between the parties in order to find that one has prevailed
over the other. The formality involved in the legal question is the vital
distinction for purposes of fee shifting-the court must provide the necessary
judicial imprimatur to justify an award of attorneys' fees.63 The Court's
decision in Buckhannon intended to put an end to courts ordering fee awards
for plaintiffs who accomplish their goals through voluntary changes in the
defendant's conduct brought about by the lawsuit.
The Court in Buckhannon, however, appeared to leave the door open for
partially prevailing parties to recover fees. In the opinion, Justice Rehnquist
quoted the Court's decision in Hanrahan v. Hampton,' stating that "Con-
gress intended to permit the interim award of counsel fees only when a party
has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims."6 He also
referenced the Court's opinion in Hewitt v. Helms,66 saying that according to
a literal reading of ordinary language, "a plaintiff [must] receive at least
some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail. 67
Justice Rehnquist added that the Court has held that both awards for nominal
19 Dotson, supra note 3, at 335.
6 Id.
63 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 598.
62 Id. at 605.
63 Id. at 598-99.
- 446 U.S. 754 (1980).
61 Id. at 758, quoted in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added).
66482 U.S. 755 (1987).
67 Id. at 760, quoted in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added).
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damages68 and settlement agreements that are enforced by consent decree 69
are sufficient to warrant an award of fees. The key distinction is not that one
party is held liable; the distinction is that the court has ordered a change in
the legal relationship between the parties.7' The Buckhannon Court held that
the catalyst theory ventures a step beyond what is allowed by allowing
awards "where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relation-
ship of the parties."71
The Court was not swayed by appeals to public policy, calling "specu-
lative" petitioner's assertion that without the catalyst theory defendants will
moot cases prior to judgment to avoid paying fees.72 The Court pointed out
that the petitioner offered no empirical evidence to support the statement
73
and countered the assertion by stating that a defendant's cessation of a
challenged practice does not necessarily moot a case because the court still
has the power to award damages for past illegal conduct. 74 Because of this
possibility, the Court suggests that defendants have a strong incentive to
reach a settlement agreement in which they would have the ability to ne-
gotiate attorneys' fees and costs. 75 The Court added an additional concern
that "[a] request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major
litigation."76
The first part of the Court's argument does not apply to claims brought
under the ESA's citizen suit provision because, unlike FHAA and ADA, ESA
does not provide for awards of damages.77 The second part of the argument,
that the courts will take some additional time to decide the issue of fee
shifting, may be true. The catalyst theory requires that a "three thresholds"
test be satisfied: the plaintiff s claims must have been colorable, the lawsuit
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), noted in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.
69 Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980), noted in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.
7 oTex. Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989), noted in
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
7" Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605. These references to the legal relationships among parties
and the possibility of partially prevailing parties receiving attorneys' fees awards may be
interpreted as prohibiting use of the catalyst test to determine whether a party was partially
prevailing when applying statutes allowing for awards of attorneys' fees to partially
prevailing plaintiffs.
72 Id. at 608.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 609.
75 Id.
76 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,437 (1983), quoted in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609.
" 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1994).
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must have been a "substantial" cause for the defendant's change in conduct,
and the defendant's change in conduct must have been motivated by the
plaintiff's threat of victory, rather than expense. 8 Evaluation of these factors
will almost certainly involve a review of the facts of the case, often signifi-
cantly adding to the time that the courts must spend in order to completely
dispose of the case. The amount of time, however, will vary from case to
case, depending on the facts. While some cases may require long delib-
eration and a lengthy review of the facts in the case, others may be
comparatively straightforward and require a very short period of time to
determine the issue of fees. More importantly, Congress has taken great steps
to ensure the success of environmental citizen suits79 and the courts have
recognized and supported the legislative intent behind statutes passed with
environmental protection in mind.80 Given this history of support, it is clear
that the ability and motivation for concerned citizens to initiate suits for
environmental protection should not be impeded by a concern for judicial
economy. It is unthinkable that the pursuit of justice should be encumbered
by mere speculation that a particular proceeding will lengthen the time a case
is before the court.
The Court's opinions in both Buckhannon and its earlier decision in
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club8 articulated a policy of following a consistent
interpretation of similarly worded fee shifting provisions in different
statutes.82 It is clear that in its Buckhannon opinion, the Court establishes that
all fee shifting statutes providing for attorneys' fees awards to "prevailing
parties" should be construed in the same manner as were the civil rights
statutes at issue in that case, and that the catalyst test is prohibited as a means
of determining whether a party prevailed. The opinion also may be inter-
preted as indicating that the catalyst test may not be used in the implemen-
tation of statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act, which provide that a
court may award attorneys' fees to a party "whenever ... appropriate."83 The
exact parameters of the Court's holding are difficult to determine. It is inter-
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610.
7 See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
'o Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978); see also supra text accompanying
note 40.
e' 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
82 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 n.4; Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682 n. 1.
83 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 681, 682 n. I (quoting the Clean Air Act § 307 (f), 91 Stat.
777,42 U.S.C. § 760(o (1976 ed., Supp. V) and stating that the Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2000), is identical).
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esting to note that the Court's majority opinion in Buckhannon neither cites
nor references its earlier decision in Ruckelshaus. In Ruckelshaus, discussed
infra, the Court held that parties obtaining "some success" on the merits of
their cases may be awarded attorneys' fees.'
B. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club: A Predecessor to Buckhannon and
Possible Redemption for the Catalyst Test in Environmental Citizen
Suits
Ruckelshaus was brought under the citizen suit provision of the Clean
Air Act ("CAA"), 8 which provides that a court may award reasonable attor-
neys' fees "whenever it determines that such an award is appropriate. 86 The
"whenever... appropriate" language in the CAA provision" is identical to
the wording in the Endangered Species Act provision88 pursuant to which
Loggerhead Turtle was based. The Court in Ruckelshaus noted sixteen other
statutes that contained provisions for the award of attorneys' fees identical
or nearly identical to the provision at issue in that case, and indicated that
their interpretation of "whenever... appropriate" should be applied to each
of those statutes.89 ESA, at issue in Loggerhead Turtle, was among the
statutes cited. 90
In Ruckelshaus, the Supreme Court held that attorneys' fees cannot be
awarded under the CAA citizen suit provision to a plaintiff who has not pre-
vailed on any of the substantive claims involved in the litigation.9' The Court
held that attorneys' fees can be awarded only to a plaintiff who has prevailed,
at least partially, on the substantive merits of the litigation.92 The Ruckels-
haus opinion does not explicitly discuss whether the catalyst theory may be
used to find that a party was a prevailing or partially prevailing party under
a statute using the "whenever . . . appropriate" language. The Court,
however, does note that the Senate Report pertaining to the CAA citizen suit
provision states that filing legitimate actions under CAA is a public service,
Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682.
8 Clean Air Act § 307(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2000).
86 Id. at § 7607(f).
87 Id.
8 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2000).
9 Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682 n.1.
9 Id.
91 Id. at 682.
92 Id. at 688-89.
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and that courts should award costs to plaintiffs in recognition of this service,
even in cases "which result in successful abatement [of the defendant's be-
havior complained of] but do not reach a verdict."93 The Senate Report seems
to describe what is now commonly known as the catalyst test.
Ruckelshaus is arguably more applicable to Loggerhead Turtle than is
Buckhannon because of the wording of the statute's citizen suit provision.
Both the CAA and ESA citizen suit provisions allow for awards of attorneys'
fees "whenever.. . appropriate," while the FHAA and ADA provisions use
the more restrictive "prevailing party" language.94 The language used in the
CAA and ESA seems to indicate a call for judicial discretion rather than
blind application of a rule of law. Because of FHAA and ADA's more spe-
cific "prevailing party" language," some plaintiffs have argued that the
Buckhannon opinion is not applicable to environmental litigation brought
under citizen suit statutes using the "whenever. . appropriate" language.96
The controversy in Ruckelshaus centered on Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") standards for coal-burning power plants.97 The Environ-
mental Defense Fund ("EDF") and the Sierra Club filed petitions for review
of EPA's guidelines in the United States District Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia.9" EDF argued that EPA's standards had been written
based on the agency's relationship with representatives of private industry.99
The Sierra Club claimed that EPA did not have the authority that it needed
under CAA to issue the type of standards that it did." The Court of Appeals
rejected all of the arguments put forth by both EDF and the Sierra Club.'
Despite their failure to win on the merits of their case, the plaintiffs filed
a request for attorneys' fees incurred in the Sierra Club matter, relying on the
" S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 38 (1970), quoted in Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 686 n.8.
94 See CAA § 307(f), 42 U.S.C.§ 7607(f) (2000); ESA § 1 l(g)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4)
(2000); ADA § 505,42 U.S.C.§ 12205 (2000); FHAA § 813(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2)
(2000).
"' See infra text accompanying notes 177-205.
9 Id.; see also, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 262 F.3d 1077 (2001); Southwest Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. Carroll, 182 F. Supp. 2d 944 (2001); Loggerhead Turtle v. County
Council, 307 F.3d 1318 (2002).
17 Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 681.
98 Id.
99 d.
100 Id.
101 Id.
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citizen suit provision' °2 of CAA."' The language of the provision states that
a judge may award attorneys' fees "whenever [the court] determines that
such award is appropriate."'" The Court of Appeals decided that although the
plaintiffs did not win on the merits, it was "appropriate" to award fees to
them because of their effort to further the goals of CAA.'0 5 The Supreme
Court reversed the opinion, stating that "some success on the merits [must]
be obtained before a party becomes eligible for a fee award... ,"06
The opinion indicates a desire to adhere to the established "American
rule," stating that "requiring a defendant, completely successful on all issues,
to pay the unsuccessful plaintiffs legal fees would be a radical departure
from long-standing fee-shifting principles adhered to in a wide range of
contexts."'0 7 The decision relies heavily on congressional intent, stating that
"virtually every one of the more than 150 existing federal fee-shifting provi-
sions predicates fee awards on some success by the claimant," though they
contain varying standards.' The Court found that by drafting the CAA
provision for fee-shifting the way that it did, Congress intended the "term
'appropriate' [to] modifly] but.., not completely reject the traditional rule
that a fee claimant must 'prevail' before it may recover attorney's fees."'"
The Court looked to the 1977 House Report on Section 307(f) to determine
the precise meaning of the wording of the statute. The report states that:
[T]he purposes of the authority to award fees are not only to
discourage frivolous litigation, but also to encourage liti-
gation which will assure proper implementation and admin-
istration of the act or otherwise serve the public interest. The
committee did not intend that the court's discretion to award
fees under this provision should be restricted to cases in
which the party seeking fees was the "prevailing party. " In
102 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f).
"0' Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 681.
10o442 U.S.C. § 7607(f), quoted in Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 681-82. This is identical language
to the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), on which the request
for fees in Loggerhead Turtle is based.
"o Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 681-82.
106Id. at 682.
"o7 Id. at 683.
108 Id. at 684.
'
09 Id. at 686.
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fact, such an amendment was expressly rejected by the
committee .... 0
The Court next considered what Congress meant by the term "prevailing
party" at the time that Section 307(f) was enacted. Generally speaking, the
term was construed quite narrowly."' There were (and still are) many
possible definitions of the term. For example, some courts defined "pre-
vailing party" as a party "who prevails as to the substantial part of the
litigation.... ,,"2 A minority of courts denied fees to plaintiffs who lacked
a formal court order granting relief. 1 3 Other courts required that the party
seeking the fee award experience 'substantial' success," as opposed to some
success.' 14 At the time that Ruckelshaus was decided, courts defined "pre-
vailing party" as a party who prevails on the "central issue.""' Based on
these standards, the Court decided that "[s]ection 307(f) was meant to expand
the class of parties eligible for fee awards from prevailing parties to partially
prevailing parties . . . [those] achieving some success, even if not major
success."
1 16
This conclusion is supported by the language of section 36 of S. 252, a
forerunner of section 307: "In any case in which such party prevails in part,
the court shall have discretion to award. . . reasonable costs." '117 Given the
legislative and judicial history cited, the Court concluded that completely
unsuccessful plaintiffs may not receive fees. "' This decision is in agreement
with the later Buckhannon decision on the issue. "9 Additionally, as explained
10 H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 337 (1977) (emphasis added), quoted in Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S.
at 687.
... Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 687.
12 Best Medium Pub. Co. v. Nat'l Insider, Inc., 385 F.2d 384, 386 (1967), noted in
Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 687-88.
M Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688.
114 Id.
It' Coen v. Harrison County Sch. Bd., 638 F.2d 24, 26 (1981), noted in Ruckelshaus, 463
U.S. at 688.116Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688.
S. 252, 95th Cong. § 36 (1976) (emphasis added), quoted in Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688-
89.
I' Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 689.
... Buckhannon Bd. & Health Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 600-05 (2001) (invalidating the catalyst theory as a method of deciding
whether a plaintiff prevailed, but stating that a plaintiff who partially prevails on the merits
is eligible for an award of attorneys' fees).
4912004]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
supra, the Court in Buckhannon seems to be in agreement with the decision
in Ruckelshaus that a party may receive a fee award if he partially prevails.
The reasoning for Congress' choice of language is undoubtedly a
reflection of congressional intent to encourage reasonable citizen suits, but
to discourage frivolous suits. Success, even in some small measure, on the
merits of a case indicates that the claims were valid and well planned. The
legislature was interested in fostering citizens' desires to resolve and prevent
problems, not simply to foster litigation.' The partially prevailing party
standard that the Court articulated in Ruckelshaus acts as a check on frivo-
lous litigation, while not requiring sincere citizen plaintiffs to take a chance
on losing more than their claims. It also fulfills the requirement that the court
convey judicial imprimatur on the party that receives the fee award, lending
more credence to the party's claims through the wisdom of the courts.
C. Interpretation of "Whenever ... Appropriate" Language in Lower
Courts
The lower federal courts have not interpreted Ruckleshaus as mandating
an automatic award of attorneys' fees to prevailing or partially prevailing
parties, but have read the opinion as giving discretion to the courts to de-
termine whether an award is warranted. Some courts have interpreted citizen
suit provisions using "whenever. . . appropriate" language to mean that in
evaluating whether a prevailing or partially prevailing plaintiff is eligible for
an award of attorneys' fees, courts should concentrate on whether the suit
furthered the purpose of the statute being litigated or benefited the public
interest.12" ' In Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of
Columbia,2 2 the D.C. Circuit Court articulated what has been called the
"'prudent effort' standard.' ' 123 The court stated that it was "appropriate" for
courts to award attorneys' fees to a plaintiff when "in light of what was
known. . . when the action was instituted, the action was of the type Con-
gress sought to encourage when it authorized awards of attorneys' fees.'
' 24
In Stoddard v. West Carolina Regional Sewerage Authority, the Fourth
Circuit cited its reasoning for awarding attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs by
120 Babich, supra note 34, at 10,141-43.
121 Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 23, Loggerhead Turtle III (No. 95-00587-CV-ORL-22).
122 639 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
.23 Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 23, Loggerhead Turtle III (No. 95-00587-CV-ORL-22).
124 Metro. Wash. Coalition for Clean Air, 639 F.2d at 804, quoted in Plaintiffs-Appellees'
Brief at 23, Loggerhead Turtle III (No. 95-00587-CV-ORL-22).
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saying that the plaintiffs' actions "will tend to ensure compliance with the
[Clean Water] Act in the very manner contemplated by Congress. . ." and
that the plaintiffs "have served the public interest by insisting that the... Act
be adequately enforced."'25 The lower courts therefore seem to say that a pre-
vailing or partially prevailing plaintiff is not automatically entitled to collect
attorneys' fees from the defendant; the plaintiffs' eligibility for a fee award
depends on whether the suit sought to further the purpose of the statute being
litigated or the public interest and whether it was successful.
The D.C. Circuit Court in Metropolitan Washington Coalition stated
that a court may award attorneys' fees "whenever such an award [is] deemed
to be 'in the public interest,"' reasoning that an award of attorneys' fees to
a citizen plaintiff is "considered ...consonant with the public interest
whenever the underlying suit was a prudent and desirable effort."' 26 This
reasoning emphasizes the importance of the plaintiffs intent as a factor in
the balance of whether the plaintiff is entitled to collect attorneys' fees from
the defendant. This position is protective of citizen plaintiffs, urging courts
to see their suits from the plaintiff's point of view. The D.C. Circuit further
explained its reasoning by saying, "[t]he attorneys' fees feature was offered
as an inducement to citizen-suits, which Congress deemed necessary; and if
the hope Congress had for such suits is to become a reality, decisions on fee-
allowance cannot make wholesale substitutions of hindsight for the legiti-
mate expectations of citizen plaintiffs."' 27 Other courts have held that an
award of attorneys' fees is "appropriate" when the plaintiff's litigation has
furthered the public interest by aiding in the interpretation or implementation
of the underlying statute as well as by substantially contributing to the
statute's goals.128 This approach, which focuses on statutory goals, has been
called the "'substantial contribution' test."'
' 29
125 Stoddard v. W. Carolina Reg'l Sewerage Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1209 (4th Cir. 1986),
quoted in Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 23, Loggerhead Turtle III (No. 95-00587-CV-ORL-
22).
126 Metro. Wash. Coalition for Clean Air, 639 F.2d at 804 (D.C. Cir. 1981), quoted in
Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 24, Loggerhead Turtle III (No. 95-00587-CV-ORL-22).
127 Id.
128 Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Sec'y of the Interior, 748 F.2d 523, 525-26
(9th Cir. 1984); Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Sierra Club v.
Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 42 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Fla. Key Deer v. Monroe County, 772 F.
Supp. 601,602-03 (S.D. Fla. 1991), noted in Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 25, Loggerhead
Turtle III (No. 95-00587-CV-ORL-22).
129 Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 24, Loggerhead Turtle III (No. 95-00587-CV-ORL-22).
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The approaches taken by the lower courts emphasize the results of the
litigation, paying little attention to judicial imprimatur. They seem inclined
to consider the big picture in deciding whether to award attorneys' fees to
plaintiffs in citizen suits, attempting to further the congressional intent under-
lying the statutes, and recognizing the discretionary nature of their option
under "whenever ... appropriate" statutes.
IV. LOGGERHEAD TURTLE V. COUNTY COUNCIL
Loggerhead Turtle is among the latest Circuit Court decisions to hold
that Buckhannon does not apply to environmental litigation brought pursuant
to citizen suit statutes in which the "wherever ... appropriate" language is
used for determination of attorneys' fees awards. 130 The decision went well
beyond the usual interpretation of the Supreme Court's position that the
standards for statutes using the "whenever ... appropriate" language are
looser than those using the "partially prevailing" language. ' 3' In Loggerhead
Turtle, the Eleventh Circuit held that the catalyst test which the Supreme
Court rejected in Buckhannon may be used to determine whether fees should
be awarded in cases brought under the citizen suit provision of the En-
dangered Species Act.'
A. Procedural History and Arguments of Plaintiffs-Appellees
Loggerhead Turtle 33 was brought in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals under the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act. 34 The
plaintiffs sought declarative and injunctive relief, claiming that the county's
refusal to ban driving on the beach and the use of artificial light sources on
11 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently announced a
similar decision, holding that "the Clean Air Act, unlike statutes that authorize fee awards
only to 'prevailing part[ies],' permits awards to so-called catalysts-parties who obtain,
through settlement or otherwise, substantial reliefprior to adjudication on the merits." Sierra
Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 322 F.3d 718, 719 (2003).
"3 See, e.g., Adam Babich, Fee ShiftingAfter Buckhannon, [2002] 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,137 (Jan. 2002); Marisa L. Ugalde, The Future of Environmental Citizen Suits
After Buckhannon Board & Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 589 (2002).
'32 Loggerhead Turtle II, 307 F.3d at 1319.
1 Id. at 1318.
114 16 U.S.C. § 1540.
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the beach during sea turtle nesting season violated the ESA "take" pro-
hibition.' At the district court level, the court awarded the plaintiffs a
preliminary injunction.'36 Soon thereafter, the county obtained an incidental
take permit from the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and the court
granted its motion for dissolution of the injunction and dismissal of the
case.'37 The court of appeals held that the incidental take permit did not allow
the county to "take protected sea turtles through purely mitigatory measures
associated with artificial beachfront lighting" and reversed and remanded the
case.'38 After the case returned to the district court, the county voluntarily
amended its lighting ordinance 3 9 and the court of appeals found the lighting
issue to be moot. 4
0
The plaintiffs-appellees based their request for fees on the theory that
they had partially prevailed in the case on two points: the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals' 1998 decision, 14' and the District Court's issuance of a
preliminary injunction in 1995.142 In addition, plaintiffs-appellees argued that
the District Court did not commit legal error in using the catalyst theory to
determine that the award of fees was "appropriate" under the citizen suit
provision of the ESA. 43 The court awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs-
appellees in the case primarily on the basis of the catalyst theory, and the
defendant's appeal of the decision was denied.'"
The Eleventh Circuit went beyond the plaintiff-appellees' arguments in
deciding that their suit merited a fee award. In a departure from (or blatant
disregard of) the Supreme Court's denouncement of the catalyst test in Buck-
hannon, the court held that the "whenever... appropriate" language in CAA
and the Clean Water Act ("CWA") was meant to "allow fee awards to
plaintiffs who do not obtain court-ordered relief but whose suit has a positive
catalytic effect."'
' 45
"' Loggerhead Turtle III, 307 F.3d at 1319-20.36 Id. at 1320.
137 Id.
' Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 148 F.3d 1231, 1258 (1 lth Cir. 1998) [hereinafter
Loggerhead Turtle II].
' Volusia County Ordinance 99-12 (1999).
140 Loggerhead Turtle Ii, 307 F.3d at 1320-2 1.
Loggerhead Turtle I1, 148 F.3d at 1231.
142 Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1182 (M.D. Fla. 1995)
[hereinafter Loggerhead Turtle I].
143 Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 11, Loggerhead Turtle III (No. 95-00587-CV-ORL-22).
144 Loggerhead Turtle III, 307 F.3d at 1327.
141 Id. at 1326.
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B. Reasoning of the Court in Loggerhead Turtle
In Loggerhead Turtle, the Eleventh Circuit decided that "Buckhannon
does not invalidate use of the catalyst test as a basis for awarding attorney's
fees under the ESA."'" The court cited three reasons for their decision. The
first, and most important, centered on congressional intent.'47 The court
decided that "there is clear evidence that Congress intended that a plaintiff
whose suit furthers the goals of a 'whenever ... appropriate' statute be
entitled to recover attorney's fees."' 48 The court found that Congress intended
courts to use the catalyst test to decide motions for fee awards.'49 The opinion
quotes from the 1970 Senate Report for CAA 50 which used language iden-
tical to the ESA's "whenever ... appropriate" language in its fee shifting
provision, saying:
The Courts should recognize that in bringing legitimate
actions under this section citizens would be performing a
public service and in such instances the courts should award
costs of litigation to such party. This should extend to
plaintiffs in actions that result in successful abatement but do
not reach a verdict. For instance, if as a result of a citizen
proceeding and before a verdict is issued, a defendant abated
a violation, the court may award litigation expenses borne by
the plaintiffs in prosecuting such actions.'5
The court's interpretation based on this language is that cases which are
mooted when a party changes its behavior or policy as a result of litigation
but prior to a decision by the court are victories which warrant fee shifting,
although they lack the judicial imprimatur that was so important in the Buck-
hannon decision.1 52
The second reason that the court gave in support of their holding was
that the Supreme Court in Buckhannon did not mention the Ruckelshaus
decision or the class of fee shifting statutes that use the "whenever...
'
46 Id. at 1325.
147Id.
148 Id.
1491d.
150 S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 38 (1970).
Is' Id., quoted in Loggerhead Turtle III at 1325 (emphasis added).
2 See supra discussion ofjudicial imprimatur in text accompanying notes 61-63.
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appropriate" language in their opinion." 3 The Court considered only the
meaning of "prevailing party," which they called a "legal term of art .... " 4
Because the ESA citizen suit provision does not use the "prevailing party"
language, the meaning that the Court in Buckhannon attributed to that term
as well as its implications for fee shifting are irrelevant in a case brought
under the ESA citizen suit provision.
The court's third reason for its holding was a public policy concern. As
previously stated, the Court in Buckhannon discounted the petitioner's
argument that defendants could avoid liability for fees by voluntarily altering
their conduct because "so long as the plaintiff has a cause of action for
damages, a defendant's change in conduct will not moot the case."' 5 The
Eleventh Circuit in Loggerhead Turtle disagreed with this assertion.'56 Their
opinion points out that under the citizen suit provision of ESA, plaintiffs
"may only seek equitable relief; damages are not available.""' ADA 58 and
the FHAA 59 both allow for damages to be assessed against an offending
party. This availability of damages issue is another fundamental difference
between the statutory provisions underlying the Buckhannon and Loggerhead
Turtle cases in addition to the wording in their fee shifting provisions.
Because of this difference, the Court's statement in Buckhannon regarding
damages has the opposite effect when applied to fee shifting provisions, such
as ESA, authorizing only injunctive relief. In fact, there is a greater incentive
for defendants to accede to plaintiffs' demands, mooting valid, strong and
important ESA cases than they are in weak or close cases, because the
defendant will see that the plaintiff has a good chance of prevailing on the
merits and obtaining a fee award. 60 A policy of not allowing the use of the
catalyst theory for fee shifting will render the citizen suit provision of the
ESA ineffective by making it impractical and too costly to bring citizen
suits.,,,
's Loggerhead Turtle II1, 307 F.3d at 1326.
154 Id. (citations omitted).
155 Id. (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608-09).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000).
59 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (2000).
" Loggerhead Turtle I1, 307 F.3d at 1326.
161 Id. at 1326-27; Marisa L. Ugalde, The Future of Environmental Citizen Suits After
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 589, 589 (2002).
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The Eleventh Circuit's policy concern is illustrated by facts of the
Loggerhead Turtle case. "[T]he County amended its lighting ordinance only
after more than four years of litigation, closely on the heels of the [appellate
court's] decision favorable to [the plaintiffs]" on the lighting issue.'62 This
is a clear example of a defendant mooting the plaintiffs claim in hopes of
avoiding an award of attorneys' fees. Allowing this sort of manipulation vir-
tually ensures that the plaintiff will lose on costs every time. A simple econ-
omic calculation leads the defendant to change its conduct to avoid paying
the plaintiff's costs. The court's tolerance for this sort of behavior transforms
this from being the devious choice for the defendant to being the logical one.
C. Ruckleshaus Versus Loggerhead Turtle: A Distinction of Facts
A cursory examination of the facts of the Ruckelshaus and Loggerhead
Turtle cases indicates that there is a much stronger case for a fee award to the
plaintiffs in Loggerhead Turtle. The factual differences between the two
cases may lead some to wonder whether the Court's decision on fee shifting
in Ruckelshaus would have differed if the facts of that case had more closely
resembled those in Loggerhead Turtle.
The Court in Ruckelshaus refused to award fees to the plaintiffs because
they achieved no success on the merits of their case. 63 The Ruckleshaus
plaintiffs based their claim for fees on their efforts in support of the goals of
CAA. 6 The plaintiffs in Loggerhead Turtle, however, did enjoy some
success on the merits, which arguably led to the defendant's change in con-
duct. 165
The Court in Ruckelshaus stated that the citizen suit provision of CAA
is "meant to expand the class of parties eligible for fee awards from
prevailing parties to partially prevailing parties-parties achieving some
success, even if not major success."' 166 The facts in Loggerhead Turtle seem
to fulfill these requirements. Volusia County changed its lighting ordinance
in June of 1999, four years after the plaintiffs filed their complaint. During
those four years, the district court granted the plaintiffs request for a prelim-
162 Loggerhead Turtle III, 307 F.3d at 1327.
63 Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 693 (1983).
'"Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682.
165 See infra text accompanying notes 168-69.
" Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688.
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inary injunction167 and just prior to the county's decision to change its
ordinance, the Court of Appeals ruled that the county's incidental take permit
did not authorize them to "take" sea turtles by using artificial light sources. 6
Through the injunction issued by the district court and the appellate court's
decision on the incidental take permit, the plaintiffs clearly achieved some
success on the merits of their case before the county mooted the case by ac-
ceding to their demands. Just the preliminary injunction would have been
enough to classify the plaintiffs-appellees as "partially prevailing." In
Ketterle v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 69 the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff who
obtains a preliminary injunction that temporarily grants the plaintiff the
ultimate relief sought in the litigation is a "prevailing party" who is eligible
for an award of attorneys' fees, even if the case is later dismissed as moot.
7
In Ruckelshaus, if the plaintiffs had prevailed on even one point, based on the
Court's announced policy,1 7' it should have allowed a fee award for the
plaintiffs. This would have been a much stronger and clearer precedent.
Loggerhead Turtle is also a much stronger case than Ruckleshaus from
a policy standpoint. As stated earlier, it is a classic case of a defendant in-
tentionally mooting a case in order to avoid payment of the plaintiff's legal
fees. 172 There was no change in policy or regulations by the defendant in
Ruckelshaus. 73 Therefore, the facts of the case gave no incentive for the
Supreme Court to make the leap that the Eleventh Circuit did in Loggerhead
Turtle, in deciding that the catalyst test still applies to statutes using the
"whenever ... appropriate" language. The lack of a policy or regulatory
change in Ruckelshaus left no opportunity or incentive in that case for the
Court to distinguish between citizen suit statutes using the "prevailing party"
language versus the "whenever... appropriate" language. With regard to the
issues that arose in Loggerhead Turtle, this is the important question for the
Supreme Court to address. It will have to wait, however, until the Court
'67 Loggerhead Turtle II, 148 F.3d at 1235.
168 Id. at 1246.
169 909 F.2d 425 (11 th Cir. 1991).
70 Ketterle, 909 F.2d 425, quoted in Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 18, Loggerhead Turtle III
(No. 95-00587-CV-ORL-22).
... Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688 (saying that the Act was meant to allow a partially
prevailing party to receive a fee award if they achieve "'some success,' even if not major
success" (emphasis omitted)).
P72 Loggerhead Turtle III, 307 F.3d at 1327 (stating that the defendant changed its ordinances
immediately after the court's decision on the lighting issue).
M Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 681.
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grants certiorari in a case where the facts include a defendant changing its
conduct as a result of an impending verdict.
1. "Pure" Catalyst Theory Versus Prevailing Party Theory
The plaintiffs in Loggerhead Turtle grounded their claim for a fee award
in the idea that they were a partially prevailing party.1 74 They did not claim
that they should have been able to collect attorneys' fees solely on the basis
that the county changed its behavior as a result of the pending litigation.'75
Their argument was that the catalyst test should be recognized as an alter-
native test that may be used to determine whether it is appropriate to award
attorneys' fees to a prevailing or partially prevailing plaintiff, in addition to
the public purpose tests that were in use in the lower courts. '76 The plaintiffs
crossed the threshold to become partially prevailing plaintiffs when the
district court granted their preliminary injunction in 1995 and when the court
of appeals decided that the county was not authorized to "take" sea turtles
through artificial lighting, despite their incidental take permit. 17 7 Therefore,
they satisfied the requirement set by the Supreme Court in Ruckelshaus that
in order to receive an award of attorneys' fees, a party must obtain "some
success on the merits" of its case.' 78 The plaintiffs maintained that Buck-
hannon did not control their case because, in that decision, the Supreme
Court only addressed the issue of whether the catalyst theory may be used to
decide that a party who had achieved no success on the substantive merits of
their case was a prevailing party, and because the Court did not modify or
mention the Ruckelshaus decision in their Buckhannon opinion.'79
The plaintiffs-appellees next argued that the district court did not com-
mit error by using the catalyst theory to determine that it was "appropriate"
to award attorneys' fees to them as a partially prevailing party. 8 ° The
Supreme Court's opinion in Buckhannon prohibits use of the catalyst test to
determine whether a party prevailed in litigation. 8' It does not prohibit the
' Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 12, Loggerhead Turtle III (No. 95-00587-CV-ORL-22).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 23-26. For a discussion of the public purpose tests used by lower federal courts, see
text accompanying notes 111-19.
177 Id. at 19.
178 Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682.
171 Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 14, Loggerhead Turtle III (No. 95-00587-CV-ORL-22).
"' Id. at 22.
... See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600.
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courts from using the catalyst test to determine whether it is appropriate to
award attorneys' fees to a party who has prevailed or partially prevailed on
the substantive merits of their case. 8 2 The plaintiffs-appellees pass the
catalyst test and the public purpose test used by the lower federal courts
because the county changed its lighting ordinance voluntarily in the manner
sought by the plaintiffs-appellees after four years of litigation; that change
provided better protection to sea turtles, substantially contributing to the
goals of ESA.183 Therefore, the plaintiffs-appellees' argument adhered to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Ruckelshaus and also appealed to public policy.
The Eleventh Circuit seemingly took the plaintiffs-appellees claims a
step beyond their arguments, saying that it was not necessary for the court to
issue a judgment and remedy in the plaintiffs' favor in order for them to
collect fees." 4 While the prevailing party theory put forth by the plaintiffs-
appellees is arguably in accordance with the Supreme Court's opinions on
fee shifting as articulated in Ruckelshaus and Buckhannon,'85 the Eleventh
Circuit's decision that the catalyst test which the Court forbade in Buck-
hannon may still be used under "as appropriate" statutes may seem to dis-
regard the Court's Buckhannon opinion. The Buckhannon decision makes it
clear that the requisite element for a fee award is favorable action by the
court."6 If this is the Court's requirement, the use of the catalyst theory in
Loggerhead Turtle8 7 is indefensible. The Eleventh Circuit defends its de-
cision by drawing distinctions between the statutes involved in Loggerhead
Turtle and those involved in Buckhannon, and between the facts and policy
implications of the two cases.
2. Linguistic Distinctions and Policy Implications
There are clear and inherent differences in the wording of the fee
shifting provisions of FHAA and ADA involved in Buckhannon and those of
'
82 Id. at 603 n.5; Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 22, Loggerhead Turtle III(No. 95-00587-CV-
ORL-22).
'8' Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 22-27.
184 Loggerhead Turtle 111, 307 F.3d at 1325 (saying that a plaintiff may collect an award of
fees if a defendant abandons the behavior complained of as a result of the litigation but prior
to the verdict).
185 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 (defining "prevailing party" as a party who has been
awarded some relief by the court).
186 Id. at 605 (stating that the problem with the catalyst theory is that it does not require any
"judicially sanctioned change").
.
8 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 681.
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ESA involved in Loggerhead Turtle. The FHAA and ADA provisions are
almost identical and state that the court, "in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee..
1 .88 The ESA provision states that a court may "award costs of litigation
(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party,
whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." '189 The "whenever
.. appropriate" model allows for much more discretion by the court. It is
possible to read this provision as allowing for use of the catalyst theory as
defined in Loggerhead Turtle.
The distinction between the two provision models is clear--one says
that a "prevailing party" may collect fees, while the other says that "any
party" may collect fees at the discretion of the court. It is also important to
remember, however, that both types of provisions were enacted for the same
purpose: to act as a statutory exception to the American rule of fee shifting
for the purpose of encouraging citizens to initiate a socially useful type of
litigation. The more compelling distinctions among cases arise when one
considers the implications of using either of the two models of fee shifting
in the context of the statute in which it lies.
The catalyst test protects citizen plaintiffs from manipulation by
defendants who wish to deny liability for their actions and at the same time
retain the ability to change them voluntarily if it appears that the plaintiff will
prevail. In this way, the "whenever ... appropriate" model could act as a
safety valve for defendants in environmental suits.
The word manipulation sounds harsh, but a defendant's decision to
moot a risky or losing case is based solely on logic. When operating under
a prevailing-plaintiff model provision, it simply would be wise for the defen-
dant to change its behavior when faced with the possibility of paying the
costs of the plaintiff's suit. Zealous representation would require the defen-
dant's counsel to suggest that course of action. The courts are effectively
laying the ground rules that will determine the course of environmental liti-
gation, and frequently, the winners and losers.
As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, the plaintiff's situation is far more
serious in cases initiated under the ESA's "whenever... appropriate" statute
than under the FHAA and ADA's prevailing-plaintiff statutes because of the
inability of plaintiffs to collect damages under the ESA's citizen suit
provision. In cases like Buckhannon, brought under statutes such as FHAA
"8I FHAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3613(c)(2) (2000); ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000).
"9 ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2000).
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or ADA, "so long as the plaintiff has a cause of action for damages, a
defendant's change in conduct will not moot the case,"190 but this safeguard
is not applicable to cases initiated under statutes such as ESA or CWA,
which do not allow for awards of damages. Suits brought under statutes that
do not allow for damages are much more easily mooted, and the Court's
justification in Buckhannon is not applicable to such statutes. When viewed
in this light, the Buckhannon decision does not apply to Loggerhead Turtle.
Given the Court's justification cited above, it is not logical for the same rule
to apply to citizen suit statutes that do not allow for monetary damages.
The Supreme Court, in Buckhannon and other cases,' 91 made it clear that
the American rule of fee shifting is to be followed unless there is a clearly
worded, explicitly stated, exception to the rule.' 92 It would be harmful in and
of itself to jeopardize judicial certainty by allowing exceptions to such long
standing and deeply rooted rules without good reason. This allegiance to
history and tradition is part of what is at the root of the Court's decision in
Buckhannon.'93 While the "whenever . . .appropriate" model provision
clearly affords the court more discretion than the prevailing party provision,
it is arguably not a clear exception to the American rule. The provision
comes reasonably close to creating an exception by saying that the court may
award fees to any party.' 94 This language seems to imply that a party who
loses on the merits of the case may nonetheless benefit from a fee award
from the court. This is simply one possible implication, however.
Whether "whenever... appropriate" statutory provisions are an excep-
tion to the established rule depends on the meaning of the word "appro-
priate," but the statutory provisions provide no definition. The judiciary is
clearly in need of a resolution to this issue. It has been suggested that
Congress amend its fee shifting statutes to include the catalyst theory. 9 '
Until Congress provides specificity, the courts will continue to struggle to
define "appropriate." In Ruckelshaus, the Supreme Court found that any
party who achieves "some success" on the merits of its case is eligible for a
fee award.'96 The lower federal courts have concentrated on public policy in
90 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608-09.
"' E.g., Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796); see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); see also supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
192 Id.
'93 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606.
194 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (2000).
"g Loring, supra note 5, at 1005.
196 Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682.
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deciding when it is appropriate to award attorneys' fees, often considering
the reasons why the plaintiff sought judicial relief and Congress' intent that
plaintiffs initiate citizen suits to further the goals of the underlying legis-
lation. 197
In Loggerhead Turtle, the Eleventh Circuit noted that, curiously, the
Court did not mention its Ruckleshaus opinion in its Buckhannon opinion.'
The Court must have been aware of its earlier opinion in Ruckelshaus but
chose not to discuss it. The Court seems to have consciously forgone an
excellent opportunity to reconcile the two cases and to finally put to rest the
issue of the differences in the language. The Court's decision not to use
Ruckelshaus as a precedent or even a reference point in the Buckhannon
opinion may be perceived as a sign from the Court that the language of the
two different statutes carry different meanings. This omission is certainly fur-
ther indication that the issue as to the use of the catalyst theory to award fees
under "whenever... appropriate" statutes remains unresolved.
By choosing not to adhere to the standards set forth in Ruckelshaus in
deciding Loggerhead Turtle, the Eleventh Circuit seems to deliberately defy
the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon, which renounced the use of the
catalyst test. It would have been possible for the Eleventh Circuit to decide
Loggerhead Turtle with the same outcome without taking an additional step
beyond the limits set forth by the Court in Ruckelshaus because the plaintiffs
did prevail on some points during the case on the merits.'99 The court could
easily have classified the plaintiffs as "partially prevailing parties" and com-
plied fully with the standards set forth in Ruckelshaus. Instead, the Eleventh
Circuit seems to have taken this opportunity to make a point about fee
shifting in environmental citizen suits. The Loggerhead Turtle decision
serves as an invitation for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue of fee
shifting in citizen suits, and the invitation will be strengthened if subsequent
cases persist in the use of the catalyst theory in litigation involving statutory
provisions using the "whenever... appropriate" language.
In choosing to push the case beyond the bounds of Ruckelshaus, the
Eleventh Circuit attempts to make a point. It appears that the court resents
the way that the Supreme Court's standards for fee shifting tie the court's
'"" For further discussion of the lower federal courts' interpretation of the "whenever...
appropriate" standard, see supra text accompanying notes 111-19.
198 Loggerhead Turtle III, 307 F.3d at 1326.
'9 See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
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hands, as well as those of plaintiffs. In doing this, the court is taking on a
very modem and non-traditional role for a court.2°
Courts normally stay within the realm of pure dispute resolution,
leaving policymaking to the political process. 20 1 Dispute resolution is the
traditional role of the Supreme Court, and one that the courts have generally
accepted throughout American history.20 2 It has sometimes been said that the
courts are motivated by the fear of reaching too far and being ignored by the
other two governmental branches.20 3 This deference to the legislature is evi-
dent in the Court's original announcement of the American rule in Arcambel
v. Wiseman, when the Court said "even if [the American rule of fee shifting
was] not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court,
till it is changed, or modified, by statute.,'2' The Court's words indicate the
careful, conservative manner in which they approach their rapport with
Congress.
While the courts have the exclusive power to say what the law is,205
when they choose to limit their opinions to the case at bar without expanding
their reasoning to other issues, the evolution of the meaning of the law tends
to move slowly. Modem law introduces the courts more often to the business
of policymaking.20 6 In this capacity, courts are looking to the future and con-
sidering not only the facts at issue in the particular case, but also what may
happen in subsequent cases. 20 7 This is the role that the Eleventh Circuit
boldly assumes in its opinion on Loggerhead Turtle. The opinion is rife with
200 See Kenneth L. Rosenbaurn, The Supreme Court Limits Fee Awards in Unsuccessful
Environmental Suits, [1983] 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,244, 10,247-48 (Aug.
1983).
201 See id.
202 See Harold Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs.: Lessons of
the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1305-18 (1988).
203 See id. at 1315-16. The judiciary is sometimes viewed as the weakest of the three branches
of American government because it lacks the power to compel compliance with its decisions,
while the legislature has the "power of the purse" and the power to make laws, and the
executive has the power of the military and executive agencies. Id.2
' Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796), quoted in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 249-50 (1975).
205 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1 Cranch 1803).
206 Rosenbaunm, supra note 201, at 10,247. Rosenbaum mentions the areas of modem
constitutional law and administrative environmental law as being especially progressive
areas. Id.
207 Id. at 10,247-48.
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policy concerns, looking not only backward to determine legislative intent
but also forward to ensure effective application of that intent.2 °8
V. SUPPORT FROM OTHER CIRCUITS
The Eleventh Circuit is not the first lower court to interpret the Supreme
Court's decision in Buckhannon as inapplicable to the ESA's citizen suit
provisions and other similarly worded provisions. In August of 2001, the
Tenth Circuit announced a similar opinion in Centerfor Biological Diversity
v. Norton" and the District Court for the Central District of California came
to a similar decision in Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v.
Carroll.1 0
A. Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton
The controversy in Centerfor Biological Diversity arose over the inclu-
sion of the Arkansas River shiner21 on an endangered species list. On August
3, 1994, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior published a proposed
regulation to list the Arkansas River Basin population of the shiner as an
endangered species.2"2 This publication triggered a one year period during
which the Secretary would have to do one of three things: publish a final
ruling listing the shiner as an endangered or threatened species, publish a
notice that the one year period would be extended, or publish a notice that the
proposed regulation had been withdrawn.213 In the proposed regulation, the
Secretary made a finding that the critical habitat for the shiner was not
determinable, triggering a two year period during which the habitat had to be
designated.2"4 On April 10, 1995, Congress imposed a one year moratorium
prohibiting the Secretary from determining that any additional species were
threatened or endangered." 5 When the moratorium lifted on April 26, 1997,
2o8 Loggerhead Turtle III, 307 F.3d at 1326-27 (describing how defendants in environmental
citizen suits could moot cases in order to avoid paying the plaintiff's attorneys' fees).
209 262 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 2001).
210 182 F. Supp. 2d 944 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
211 The shiner is a small fish found in New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and Kansas. For a
detailed description, see Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 262 F.3d at 1078 (citation omitted).
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1078-79.
214 Id. at 1079.
215 Id.
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the Secretary faced with a backlog of over two hundred and forty proposed
listings awaiting final determination, as well as a reduction in funding.2' 6 In
response, the Secretary created a system of priorities to rank the importance
of listing activities.2t 7 When the Secretary had not taken final action on
listing the shiner by May 13, 1997, the Center for Biological Diversity
submitted a sixty day notice to the Secretary of its intent to sue under section
1540 (g)(2)(C), and filed suit ten months later after receiving no response. 2,8
The Center filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 6, 1998, which
was not granted. 9 On November 23, 1998, the Secretary issued a final ruling
listing the shiner as a threatened species, mooting the case. 220 The parties
entered into a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal on December 7, 1998, and the
Center filed a motion for litigation costs the following March.22'
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that, based on the language
in the citizen suit provision of the ESA, a court is free to award attorneys'
fees "whenever ... appropriate. "222 Although they recognized the Court's
admonition in Ruckelshaus against awarding fees for parties who have not
achieved "some degree of success on the merits, 223 the Tenth Circuit decided
that it could use the catalyst test, forbidden just a few months before the
Center for Biological Diversity decision was rendered, because there was
never any adjudication on the merits. 224 The court, however, refused to award
costs because the Secretary entered evidence that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was
not causally linked to the decision to list the shiner as a threatened species.225
Although the plaintiffs did not receive the fees that they requested, the
Tenth Circuit's decision articulates an opinion that courts are free to use the
catalyst test in cases that arise from the citizen suit provision of ESA, and
from other statutes that use the same language. The court discussed the recent
Buckhannon opinion in footnote two of its opinion.226 In that discussion, the
216 Id.
217 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 262 F.3d at 1079.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 1080.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 694, cited in Loggerhead Turtle Il1, 307 F.3d at 1323.
224 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 262 F.3d at 1080.
22. Id. at 1081 (noting that the Secretary entered paperwork showing work on the shiner
began months before the plaintiffs filed their suit).
226 Id., at 1080 n.2.
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court pointed to the variations in language between the citizen suit provisions
in FHAA and ADA versus that in ESA provision and stated that the differ-
ence was striking enough that Buckhannon is inapplicable to suits brought
under statutes using the "whenever ... appropriate" language.22 7
B. Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Carroll
Southwest Center for Biological Diversity2 8 involved the effect of
building a dam on plants and animals in the surrounding area. In the 1980s,
the Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps") proposed construction of the
Seven Oaks Darn as part of a project to provide flood control along portions
of the Santa Ana River.229 Pursuant to ESA, the Corps consulted with the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") before beginning the
project.23 FWS conducted a study which concluded that the project would
not jeopardize the existence of the Santa Ana River woolly star,23' but it did
not address the effect that the project would have on either the slenderhomed
222331 hi aispineflower,232 the San Bernardino kangaroo rat, or their habitat. 234 Plain-
tiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the
Corps in March of 1999.235 In June, the court granted Western Municipal
Water District of Riverside and San Bernardino Valley Municipal Water
District's Motion to Intervene and in November of 2000, the court entered
227 Id.
The statute at issue in this case... contains no express requirement that
the party seeking attorney's fees be the "prevailing party" but, instead
provides, "The court, in issuing any final order in any suit ... may award
costs . . . to any party, whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate." Thus, the basis of the Court's conclusion in Buckhannon is
not applicable in this case.
Id. (citations omitted).
228 182 F. Supp. 2d944 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
229 Id. at 945.
230 Id.
23 The Santa Ana River wooly star is an endangered plant species.
232 The slenderhomed spineflower is also an endangered plant species.
233 The San Bernardino kangaroo rat is an animal that was not listed as endangered with ESA
at the time of the Seven Oaks dam proposal.
234 Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 945-46.
235 Id. at 946.
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the parties' stipulation to a voluntary dismissal.236 Plaintiffs and the inter-
vening districts moved for an award of attorneys' fees.237
The Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Buckhannon while the Cen-
tral District of California was deciding this case and the court took the
decision under careful consideration.238 The court came to the decision that,
because of the variations in the language of the statutory provisions relied
upon in the two cases, the Buckhannon decision was not applicable to the
case and awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs pursuant to the catalyst
theory.239 The court decided that in coming to the conclusion that the catalyst
theory should not apply in the context of FHAA and ADA, "the Supreme
Court [had] expressly relied on the plain meaning of the language in [the]
statutes . "...,240 The court found that the "'whenever . . appropriate'
language of the ESA is distinguishable on its face" from the FHAA and ADA
"prevailing party" language, and therefore, decided that the Supreme Court
had not considered applicability of the catalyst test to fee provisions of
ESA.24' The court considered congressional intent and decided that, based on
the legislative history of CAA quoted in Ruckelshaus, 242 Congress wanted to
encourage citizen suits and, to that end, wanted to allow for fee awards to
plaintiffs even in cases that were mooted by desirable action on the part of
the defendant.243
VI. CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW AND CONCLUSION
Based on analyses of the Buckhannon and Ruckelshaus opinions and the
three lower court decisions which interpreted those opinions, it seems that the
Supreme Court did not effectively ban use of the catalyst theory for citizen
suit provisions that use "whenever... appropriate" language. The courts are
clearly still using the catalyst theory to award attorneys' fees in citizen suits
filed under ESA and other similarly worded statutes.2 " Congress chose to
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id. -t 94648.
240 Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 947 (stating that "prevailing
party" is the language relied upon).
241 Id. at 947.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 See Loggerhead Turtle III, 307 F.3d at 1318; Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 182
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articulate the provisions for fee shifting differently in different statutes, and
has explicitly stated a desire to encourage legitimate environmental litigation
through fee shifting.245 Until the Supreme Court decides the controversy over
statutory fee shifting in citizen suits, explicitly reconciling the apparent
differences among the various statutes, or until Congress clarifies its
intentions through more specific legislation,246 the lower courts will struggle
with this issue. Hopefully, they will continue the apparent trend toward
allowing use of the catalyst theory in cases brought under ESA and similarly
worded "whenever . . . appropriate" statutes, allowing the fruitful con-
tinuation of environmental litigation in defense of our world and all of its
inhabitants.
F. Supp. 2d at 944; Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 262 F.3d 1077 (10th Cir. 2001).
245 See supra text accompanying notes 110, 151, 189-90.
246 Loring, supra note 5, at 973.
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